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Abstract 
The study of belief change has been an active area 
in philosophy and AI. In recent years, two special 
cases of belief change, belief revision and belief 
update, have been studied in detail .  Roughly 
speaking, revision treats a surprising observation 
as a sign that previous beliefs were wrong, while 
update treats a surprising observation as an indi­
cation that the world has changed. In general, we 
would expect that an agent making an observa­
tion may both want to revise some earlier beliefs 
and assume that some change has occurred in 
the world. We define a novel approach to be­
lief change that allows us to do this, by apply­
ing ideas from probability theory in a qualitative 
settings. The key idea is to use a qualitative 
Markov assumption, which says that state tran­
sitions are independent We show that a recent 
approach to modeling qualitative uncertainty us­
ing plausibility measures allows us to make such 
a qualitative Markov assumption in a relatively 
straightforward way, and show how the Markov 
assumption can be used to provide an attractive 
belief-change model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The question of how an agent should change his beliefs after 
making an observation or performing an action has attracted 
a great deal of recent attention. There are two proposals that 
have received perhaps the most attention: belief revision 
[Alchourr6n, Gardenfors, and Makinson 1 985; Gardenfors 
1988] and belief update [Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991]. 
Belief revision focuses on how an agent changes his be­
liefs when he acquires new information; belief update, on 
the other hand, focuses on how an agent should change 
his beliefs when he realizes that the world has changed. 
Both approaches attempt to capture the intuition that to 
accommodate a new belief, an agent should make mini­
mal changes. The d ifference between the two approaches 
comes out most clearly when we consider what happens 
when an agent observes something that is inconsistent with 
his previous beliefs. Revision treats the new observation as 
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an indication that some of the previous beliefs were wrong 
and should be discarded. It tries to choose the most plausi­
ble beliefs that can accommodate the observation. Update, 
on the other hand, assumes that the previous beliefs were 
correct, and that the observation is an indication that a 
change occurred in the world. It then tries to fi nd the most 
plausible change that accounts for the observation and to 
predict what else has changed as a result 
In general, we would expect that an agent making an ob­
servation may want both to revise some earlier beliefs and 
to assume that some change has occurred in  the world. To 
see this, consider the following example (which is a variant 
of Kautz's stolen car example [ 1986], and closely resem­
bles the borrowed-car example in [Friedman and Halpern 
1994b]): A car is parked with a full fuel tank at time 0; at 
time 2, the owner returns to find i t  parked where he left it. If 
the owner believes that parked cars tend to stay put, then he 
would believe that no changes occurred between time 0 and 
2. What should he believe when, at time 3, he d iscovers that 
the fuel tank is empty? Update treats this observation as 
an indication of a change between time 2 and 3, for exam­
ple, a gas leak. Revision, on the other hand, treats it as an 
indication that previous beliefs, such as the belief that the 
tank was full at time 2, were wrong. In practice, the agent 
may want to consider a number of possible explanations 
for his time-3 observation, depending on what he considers 
to be the most l ikely sequence(s) of events between time 0 
and time 3. For example, if he has had previous gas leaks, 
then he may consider a gas leak to be the most plausible 
explanation. On the other hand, if his wife also has the 
car keys, he may consider it possible that she used the car 
in his absence. Is there a reasonable approach that lets us 
capture these considerations in a natural manner? In this 
paper, we show that there is and, indeed, we can get one by 
applying straightforward ideas from probability theory in a 
qualitative setting. 
To understand our approach, it is helpful to review what a 
probabilist would do. The first step is to get an appropriate 
model of the situation. As was argued in [Friedman and 
Halpern 1995a; Friedman and Halpern 1994b], to capture 
belief change appropriately, we need a model of how the 
system changes over time. We assume that at each point 
in t ime, the system is in some state. A run of the system 
is a function from time (which we assume ranges over 
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the natural numbers) to states; thus, a run is essentially a 
sequence of states. A run can be thought of as a description 
of how the system changes over time. We identify a system 
with a set of runs. Intuitively, we are identifying the system 
with its possible behaviors. 
The standard probabilistic approach would be to put a prob­
ability on the runs of the system. This is the agent's prior 
probability, and captures his initial beliefs about the relative 
likelihood of runs. As the agent receives information, he 
changes his beliefs using conditioning. 
One obvious problem with this approach is that, even if 
there are only two possible states, there are uncountably 
many possible runs. How can an agent describe a prior 
probability over such a complex space? The standard so­
lution to this problem is to assume that state transitions are 
independent of when they occur, that is, that the probability 
of the system going from state s to state s' is indepen­
dent of the sequence of transitions that brought the system 
to state s. This Markov assumption significantly reduces 
the complexity of the problem. All that is necessary is to 
describe the probability of state transitions. Moreover, the 
Markov assumption has been shown to be widely applicable 
in practice [Kemeny and Snell 1960; Howard 1971). 
Another problem with a straightforward use of probability 
is that, in many situations, an agent may not know the ex­
act probability of various state transitions, although he may 
have some more qualitative information about them. In the 
l iterature, there are many approaches to representing quali­
tative beliefs: preferential structures [Kraus, Lehmann, and 
Magidor 1990], possibilistic measures [Dubois and Prade 
1990], 11:-rankings [Spohn 1988; Goldszmidt and Pearl 
1992], and logics of extreme probabilities [Pearll989]. We 
represent beliefs here using plausibility measures [Fried­
man and Halpern 1995b], an approach that generalizes all 
the earlier approaches. A plausibility measure is a quali­
tative analogue of a probability measure; it associates with 
every event its plausibility, which is just an element in a 
partially ordered space. 
As shown in [Friedman and Halpern 1995a], we can de­
fine a natural notion of belief using plausibility, where a 
proposition is believed exactly if it is more plausible than 
its complement. It is also easy to define a notion of con­
ditioning in plausibility spaces (as done in [Friedman and 
Halpern 1995b)). Once we apply conditioning to the notion 
of belief, we get a notion of belief change. Interestingly, 
it can be shown that belief revision and belief update both 
can be viewed as instances of such belief change [Friedman 
and Halpern 1994b]. That is, we can get belief revision and 
belief update when we condition on the appropriate plausi­
bility measures. Not surprisingly, the plausibility measures 
that capture belief revision are ones that consider plausible 
only runs where the world never changes over time. On the 
other hand, the plausibility measures that capture belief up­
date are ones that make plausible those runs in which, in a 
precise sense, abnormalities are deferred as late as possible. 
The plausibility measures that give us belief revision and 
belief update are fairly special, and do not capture many 
typical situations. We would like to specify a prior plausi-
bility measure over runs that captures our initial assessment 
of the relative plausibility of runs. As in the probabilistic 
settings, such a prior can be quite complex. We can use (a 
qualitative analogue of) the Markov assumption to simplify 
the description of the prior plausibility. 
Making a (qualitative) Markov assumption gives us a well­
behaved notion of belief change, without making the occa­
sionally unreasonable assumptions made by belief revision 
and update. In particular, it allows a user to weigh the rela­
tive plausibility that a given observation is due to a change 
in the world or due to an inaccuracy in previous beliefs. In 
the car example, this means that the agent can decide the 
relative plausibility of a gas leak and his wife's taking the 
car, without making the commitment to one or the other, as 
required by update and revision. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we re­
view the probabilistic approach. Then, in Section 3, we 
review the definition of plausibility and discuss conditional 
plausibility. In Section 4, we introduce Markovian plausi­
bility measures and show how they can be used to induce an 
interesting notion of belief change. In Section 5, we exam­
ine the situation where the user is willing only to compare 
the plausibility of transitions, without committing to their 
magnitude. We characterize what beliefs follow from such 
a partial specification. In Section 6, we compare our ap­
proach to others in the literature. We end with a discussion 
of these results and directions of future research in Sec­
tion 7. 
2 PROBABILISTIC BELIEF CHANGE 
To reason about a space W probabilistically, we need a 
probability measure on W. Formally, that means we have 
a probability space (W, F, Pr), where F is an algebra of 
measurable subsets of W (that is, a set of subsets closed 
under union and complementation, to which we assign 
probability) function mapping each event (i.e., a subset 
of W) in F to a number in [0, 1], satisfying the well­
known Kolmogorov axioms (Pr(0) = 0, Pr(W) = 1, and 
Pr(A U B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) if A and Bare disjoint).' 
Probability theory also dictates how we should change our 
beliefs. If the agent acquires evidence E, his beliefs af­
ter learning E are specified by the conditional probability 
Pr(-IE). Note that by using conditioning, we are implic­
itly assuming that the information E is correct (since we 
assign E-the complement of E-probability 0), and that 
discovering E is telling us only that E is impossible; the 
relative probability of subsets of E is the same before and 
after conditioning. 
We want to reason about a dynamically changing system. 
To do so, we need to identify the appropriate space W 
and the events of interest ( i .e., F). We assume that the 
system changes in discrete steps, and that after each step, 
the system is in some state. We denoted by S the set of 
possible states of the system. As we said in the introduction, 
1For ease of exposition, we do not make the requirement that 
probability distributions be countably additive here. 
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a run is a function from the natural numbers to states. Thus, 
a run r describes a particular execution that goes through 
the sequence of states r(O), r( 1), .... We identify a system 
with a set of runs, and take W to consist of these runs. 
There are various events that will be of interest to us; we 
always assume without comment that the events of interest 
are in F. One type of event of interest is denoted S; = s; 
this is the set of runs r such that r(i) = s.2 A time-n event 
is a Boolean combination of events of the form S; = s, for 
i :::; n. We are particularly interested in time-n events of 
the form (So= so) n · · -n(Sn = sn), which we abbreviate 
[so, . . . , Sn]; this is the set of all runs in W with initial prefix 
so, . . . , sn. We call such an event an n-prejix. Note that 
any time-n event is a union of n-prefixes. 
As discussed in the introduction, describing a distribution 
Pr on runs can be difficult. Even when S contains only 
two states, W is uncountable. In the probabilistic litera­
ture, this difficulty is often dealt with by making a Markov 
assumption. 
Definition 2.1: A Markov chain [Kemeny and Snelll960] 
over S1, Sz, ... is a measure Pr on W that satisfies 
• Pr(Sn+ l = Sn+i IE, Sn = s,) = Pr(Sn+l = Sn+l I 
Sn = sn), where E is any time-n event, 
• Pr(Sm+i = s' ISm = s) = Pr(Sn+l = s'JSn = s). 
We say that Pr is a Markovian measure if it is a Markov 
chain over So, St, .... I 
The first requirement states that the probability of Sn+ 1 = 
sn+t is independent of preceding states given the value 
of Sn: The probability of going from state Sn = Sn to 
Sn+t = sn+l is independent of how the system reached 
S, = Sn. The second requirement is that the transition 
probabilities, i.e., the probabilities of transition from states 
to states', do not depend on the time of the transition. Many 
systems can be modeled so as to make both assumptions 
applicable. 
If we assume that the system has a unique initial state s0 (that 
is, r(O) = s0 for all runs ,. E W), and specify transition 
probabilities p,,,,, with I:,'ES p,,,, = 1, for each s E S, 
then it is easy to show that there is a unique Markovian 
measure Pr on the algebra generated by events of the form 
sj = s such that Pr(Sn+l = s'ISn = s) = P•.•'· We can 
define Pr on then-prefixes by induction on n. The case of 
n = 0 is given by Pr([s0]) = I. For the inductive step, 
assuming that we have defined Pr([so, . . . , sn-d), we have 
Pr( [so, . . . , sn]) 
Pr(Sn = snJ[so, ... ,sn-d) X Pr( [so , ... ,Sn-1])) 
P•n-I·'• X Pr([so, ... , Sn-d· 
An easy induction argument now shows 
Pr([so, . . . 'sn]) = P•o.•t X . . . X p • .,_],•n· 
2Technically, S; is a random variable taking on values in S, 
the set of states. 
Since a time-n event is a union of n-prefixes, this shows 
that Pr is determined for all time-n events. 
If S is finite, this gives us a compact representation of 
the distribution over W. Of course, even if we do not 
have a unique initial state, we can construct a Markovian 
probability distribution from the transition probabilities and 
the probabilities Pr([s]) for s E S. For ease of exposition, 
throughout this paper, we make the following simplifying 
assumption. 
Simplifying assumption: S contains the state so 
and W is a set of runs over S, all of which have 
initial state so. 
Obvious analogues of our results hold even without this 
assumption. 
3 PLAUSIBILITY MEASURES 
Our aim is to find analogues of probabilistic belief change 
in situations where we do not have numeric probabilities. 
We do so by using notion of a plausibility space, which is 
a natural generalization of probability space [Friedman and 
Halpern 1995b ]. We simply replace the probability measure 
Pr by a plausibility measure PI, which, rather than mapping 
sets in F to numbers in [0, 1], maps them to elements in 
some arbitrary partially ordered set. We read PI( A) as "the 
plausibility of set A". If PI( A) s PI( B), then B is at least 
as plausible as A. Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple 
S = (W, :F, D, PI), where W is a set of worlds, F is an 
algebra of subsets of W, Dis a domain of plausibility values 
partially ordered by a relation :::;n (so that :::;n is reflexive, 
transitive, and anti-symmetric), and PI maps the sets in F 
to D. We assume that Dis pointed: that is, it contains two 
special elements T n and l.n such that l.n:::;n d :::;n T D 
for all d E D; we further assume that Pl(W) = T D and 
Pl(0) =l.n. The only other assumption we make is 
Al. If A� B, then Pl(A):::; PI( B). 
Thus, a set must be at least as plausible as any of its subsets. 
As usual, we define the ordering <n by taking dt <n d2 if 
d1 Sn d2 and d1 f:. d2. We omit the subscript D from :::;n, 
<n, T n, and ..Ln whenever it is clear from context. 
Clearly plausibility spaces generalize probability spaces. 
They also are easily seen to generalize Dempster-Shafer 
belief functions [Shafer 1976] and fuzzy measures [Wang 
and Klir 1992], including possibility measures [Dubois and 
Prade 1990]. Of more interest to us here is another approach 
that they generalize: An ordinal ranking (or li-ranking) on 
W (as defined by [Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992], based on 
ideas that go back to [Spohn 1988]) is a function,.,; : 2w -+ 
IN*, where IN* = IN U { oo}, such that !i(W) = 0, !i(0) = 
<X>, and !i(A) = minaEA !i( {a}) if A f:. 0. Intuitively, an 
ordinal ranking assigns a degree of surprise to each subset 
of worlds in W, where 0 means unsurprising, and higher 
numbers denote greater surprise. Again, it is easy to see 
that if,.,; is a ranking on W, then (W, IN*, K) is a plausibility 
space, where x sIN· y if and only if y :::; x under the usual 
ordering on the ordinals. 
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Conditioning plays a central role in probabilistic belief 
change. In [Friedman and Halpern 1995b], we define an 
analogue of conditioning for plausibility. Just as a con­
ditional probability measure associates with each pair of 
sets A and B a number, Pr(AjB), a conditional plausi­
bility measure associates with pairs of sets a conditional 
plausibility. Formally, a conditional plausibility measure 
maps maps a pair of sets A and B to a plausibility, usually 
denoted Pl(AjB), where for each fixed B -::f- 0, PI( ·JB) 
is a plausibility measure, satisfying a coherence condi­
tion described below. A conditional plausibility space is 
a tuple (W, F, D, PI), where PI is a conditional plausibil­
ity measure. In keeping with standard practice in prob­
ability theory, we also write PI( A, BJD, E) rather than 
PI( An BID n E). The coherence condition is 
Cl. Pl(AJC, E) :S Pl(BjC, E) if and only if 
Pl(A, C\E) :S Pl(B, CIE). 
C l captures the relevant aspects of probabilistic condition­
ing: after conditioning by C, the plausibility of sets that are 
disjoint from C becomes _1_, and the relative plausibility of 
sets that are subsets of C does not change. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, we are interested 
here in plausibility measures that capture certain aspects of 
qualitative reasoning. We say that an event A is believed 
given evidence E according to plausibility measure PI if 
PI( A, E) > Pl(A, E), that is, if A is more plausible than 
its complement when E is true. Notice that, by Cl, this is 
equivalent to saying that Pl(AjE) > Pl(AjE). Moreover, 
note that if Pl is a probability function, this just says that 
Pr(AjE) is greater than 1/2. Probabilistic beliefs defined 
this way are, in general, not closed under conjunction. We 
may believe A and believe A' without believing A n A'. 
In [Friedman and Halpern 1996], we show that a necessary 
and sufficient condition for an agent's beliefs to be closed 
under conjunction is that the plausibility measure satisfies 
the following condition: 
A2. If A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets, PI( A U B) > 
Pl(C), and Pl(AUC) > Pl(B), then PI( A)> Pl(B U 
C). 
Plausibility measures that satisfy A2 are called qualitative.3 
We can now state precisely the property captured by A2. 
Given a plausibility measure PI, let BelpJ (E) = {A : 
Pl(AjE) > Pl(AjE)}. We then have: 
Theorem 3.1: [Friedman and Halpern 1996]4 PI is a qual­
itative plausibility measure if and only if, for all events A 
B, and E. if A, B E Belp1(E) then An BE BelpJ(E). 
3Jn [Friedman and Halpern 1996], we also assumed that 
qualitative plausibility measures had an additional property: if 
Pl(A) = Pl(B ) = ..L, then Pl(A U B) = .l.. This property plays 
no role in our results, so we do not assume it explicitly here. (In 
fact, it follows from assumptions we make in the next section 
regarding decomposability.) 
4Th is result is a immediate corollary of [Friedman and Halpern 
1996, Theorem 5.4]. The same result was discovered indepen­
dently by Dubois and Prade [ 1995]. 
It is easy to show that possibility measures and ��:-rankings 
define qualitative plausibility spaces. In addition, as we 
show in [Friedman and Halpern 1996], preferential or­
derings [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990], and PPDs 
(parameterized probability distributions, which are used in 
defining t-semantics [Pearl 1989]) can be embedded into 
qualitative plausibility spaces. On the other hand, proba­
bility measures and Dempster-Shafer belief functions are in 
general not qualitative. Since our interest here is in qualita­
tive reasoning, we focus on qualitative plausibility spaces 
(although some of our constructions hold for arbitrary plau­
sibility measures). 
Using qualitative (conditional) plausibility spaces we can 
model belief change in dynamic systems. Both revision 
and update are concerned with beliefs about the current 
state of the world. We follow this tradition, although most 
of our results also apply to richer languages (which allow, 
for example, beliefs about past and future states). Suppose 
(W, F, D, PI) is a plausibility space, where W is a system 
consisting of all the runs over some state space S. Infor­
mally, we want to think of a language that makes statements 
about states. That means that each formula in such a lan­
guage can be identified with a set of states. In particular, 
a proposition (set of states) A in such a language is true 
at time n in a run r if r(n) E A. Using the notion of 
belief defined earlier, A is believed to be true at time n if 
the plausibility of the set of runs where A is true at time 
n is greater than the plausibility of the set of runs where 
it is false. To make this precise, if A is a set of states, let 
A(n) = {r E W: r( n) E A}. Thus, A(n) is the set of runs 
where A is true at time n. Then we define 
Bel�\(E) =def {A� S I Pl(A(n)IE) > Pl(�n)IE)}. 
We can think of BeFp1( E) as characterizing the agent's be­
liefs about the state of the world at time n, given evidence 
E. (We omit the subscript PI from BeL;;1 whenever it is clear 
from the context.) 
This construction-which essentially starts with a prior on 
runs and updates it by conditioning in the light of new 
information-is analogous to the probabilistic approach for 
handling observations. 
We can also relate our approach to the more standard ap­
proaches to belief change [Alchourr6n, Gardenfors, and 
Makinson 1985; Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991]. In these 
approaches, it is assumed that an agent has a belief set K, 
consisting of a set of formulas that he believes. J{ * A 
represents the agent's belief set after observing A. We can 
think of Bel0(S) as characterizing the agent's initial belief 
set J{. For each proposition A, we can identify Bell (A) 
with ]{ * A. In this framework, we can also do iterated 
change: Beln(A\') 1\ ... 1\ A�n)) is the agent's belief state 
after observing A1, then A2, . . . , and then An. 
As we have shown in previous work [1995a, 1994b], condi­
tioning captures the intuition of minimal change that under­
lies most approaches to belief change. In particular, both 
belief revision and belief update can be viewed as instances 
of conditioning on the appropriate prior. As expected, the 
prior plausibility measures that correspond to revision as-
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sign plausibility only to runs where the system does not 
change, but are fairly unstructured in other respects. On the 
other hand, the prior plausibility measures that correspond 
to update allow the system to change states, but put other 
constraints on how change can occur. Roughly speaking, 
they prefer runs where surprising events occur as late as 
possible. 
4 MARKOVIAN BELIEF CHANGE 
As we said in the introduction, we would like a notion 
of belief change that allows us both to revise our previous 
beliefs about the world and to allow for a change in the world 
occurring. Moreover, we need to address the question of 
representing the plausibility measure on runs. Can we get 
measures with reasonable belief-change properties that can 
be represented in a natural and compact manner? In the 
probabilistic framework, the Markov assumption provides 
a solution to both problems. As we now show, it is also 
useful in the plausibilistic setting. 
The definition of Markovian probability measures general­
izes immediately to plausibility measures. A conditional 
plausibility space (W, :F, D, PI) is Markovian if it satisfies 
the same conditions as in Definition 2.1, with Pr replaced by 
Pl. Given a Markovian plausibility space (W, :F, D, PI), we 
define the transition plausibilities analogously to the transi­
tion plausibilities: that is, t,,,, = Pl(Sn+i = s' I Sn = s). 
In the probabilistic setting, the Markov assumption has 
many implications that can be exploited. In particular, we 
can easily show the existence and uniqueness of a Marko­
vian prior with a given set of transition probabilities. Can 
we get a similar result for Markovian plausibility spaces? 
In general, the answer is no. To get this property, and the 
other desirable properties of Markovian plausibility spaces, 
we need to put more structure on plausibility measures. 
In showing that there is a unique Markovian measure de­
termined by the transition probabilities, we made use of 
two important properties of probability: The first is that 
Pr(A, B) is determined as Pr(BIA) x Pr(A). (We used 
this to calculate Pr([so, ... , sn]).) The second is that 
Pr(A U B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B), if A and B are disjoint. 
(This was used to get the probability of an arbitrary time­
n event from the probability of the time-n prefixes.) We 
would like to have analogues of+ and x for plausibility. 
To get an analogue of +,  we need to assume that the plausi­
bility of the union of two disjoint sets A and B is a function 
of the plausibility of A and the plausibility of B. We call a 
plausibility measure Pl decomposable if there is a function 
EB that is commutative, monotonic (so that if d � d', then 
d EB e � d' EB e), and additive (so that d EB l. = d and 
dEf)T = T) such that Pl(AU B)= PI( A) Ef)Pl(B) if A and 
B are disjoint. In [Friedman and Halpern 1995b], natural 
conditions are provided that guarantee that a plausibility 
measure is decomposable. Note that probability measures 
are decomposable, with EB being +. possibility measures 
are decomposable with EB being max, and K-rankings are 
decomposable with EB being min. By way of contrast, belief 
functions are not decomposable in general. 
We next want to get an analogue of x, to make sure that 
conditioning acts appropriately. More precisely, we want 
there to be a function® that is commutative, associative, 
strictly monotonic (so that if d > d' and e =f 1., then 
d� > d'�),and bottom-preserving(so thatd@J.. = l.)n 
such that Pl(AIB, C) @Pl(BIC) =PI( A, BIG). 
An algebraic domain is a tuple (D, ffi, @) where D is a 
partially-ordered pointed domain, and EB and ® are bi­
nary operations on D satisfying the requirements we de­
scribed above, such that ®distributes over ffi. Algebraic 
domains are typically used in quantitative notions of uncer­
tainty. For example, ([0, 1], +, x ) is used for probability 
and (IN*, min,+) is used for K-rankings.5 The standard ex­
amples of algebraic domains in the literature are totally or­
dered. However, it is not hard to construct partially-ordered 
algebraic domains. For example, consider ([0, It, ffi, @), 
where EB and ® are defined pointwise on sequences, and 
(xt, . . . , Xn ) ::-; (Yt, .. . , Yn} if X; � y; for 1 � i � n. This 
is clearly a partially-ordered algebraic domain. 
In this paper, we focus on plausibility spaces that are based 
on algebraic domains. A structured plausibility space 
(W, :F, D, PI) is one for which there exist® and EB such 
that (D, @, Ef)}, is an algebraic domain, and PI is such that 
PI(AU BIE) = Pl(AIE) ffiPl(BIE) for disjoint A and B, 
and PI(AIB, C) @Pl(BIC) = Pl(A, BIG). (We remark 
that Darwiche [ 1992] and Weydert [ 1994] consider notions 
similar to structured plausibility spaces; we refer the reader 
to [Friedman and Halpern l995b] for a more detailed dis­
cussion and comparison.) 
From now on we assume that that Markovian plausibility 
spaces are structured. In the probabilistic setting, Marko­
vian priors are useful in part because they can be described 
in a compact way. Similar arguments show that this is the 
case in the plausibilistic setting as well. 
Theorem 4.1: Let (D, ffi, @}be an algebraic domain, and 
let { t, ,•' : t, ,•' E D} be a set of transition plausibilities 
such that EB•'Est•,•' = T D for all s E S. Then there is 
a unique Markovian plausibility space (W, :F, D, PI) such 
that P!(Sn+l = s' I Sn = s) = t,,,, for all states sands' 
and for all times n. 
Proof: (Sketch) Define PI so that 
Pl([so, ... , sn]) = t,0,s,@ · · · @t•n-l ,•n · 
It is straightforward to show, using the properties of EB and 
@, that PI is uniquely defined. I 
Since we want to capture belief, we are particularly inter­
ested in qualitative plausibility spaces. Thus, it is of interest 
to identify when this construction results in a qualitative 
plausibility measure. It turns out that when the domain is 
totally ordered, we can ensure that the plausibility measure 
is qualitative by requiring EB to be max. 
5For possibility, ('R., max, min) is often used; this is not quite 
an algebraic domain, since min is not strictly monotonic. How­
ever, all our results but one-Theorem 5.3-holds as long as Q9 is 
monotonic, even if it is not strictly monotonic. 
268 Friedman and Halpern 
Proposition 4.2: Let {D, Ef), @) be an algebraic domain 
such that �D is totally ordered and d Ef> d' = d whenever 
d' �D d. Then the plausibility space of Theorem 4.1 is 
qualitative. 
It remains an open question to find natural sufficient condi­
tions to guarantee that the plausibility space of Theorem 4.1 
is qualitative when Dis only partially ordered. 
We now have the tools to use the Markov assumption in 
belief change. To illustrate these notions, we examine how 
we would formalize Kautz's stolen car example [1986] and 
the variant discussed in the introduction. 
Example 4.3: Recall that in the original story, the car is 
parked at time 0 and at time 3 the owner returns to find it 
gone. In the variant, the car is parked with a full fuel tank 
at time 0, at time 2 the owner returns to find it parked where 
he left it, but at time 3 he observes that the fuel tank is 
empty. To model these examples we assume there are three 
states: Bpe , Bpe, and sp-e. In Bpe• the car is parked with a full 
tank; in Bpe• the car is parked with an empty tank; and in sp-e 
the car is not parked and the tank is full. We consider two 
propositions: Parked= {spe-, spe} and Full= {spe-. s�}-
In the original story, the evidence at time 3 is captured by 
Estolen = Parked( D) n Fulf0) n Parkei3), since Parked il 
Full is observed at time 0, and Parked is observed at time 3. 
Similarly, the evidence in the variant at time 2 is captured 
by E�orrowed = Parked( D) il Fulf0) il Parked(z), and at time 
3 by E�orrowed = E�orrowed n Parked(3) n FutP). 
We now examine one possible Markovian prior for this 
system. The story suggests that the most likely transitions 
are the ones where no change occurs. Suppose we attempt 
to capture this using 11:-rankings. Recall that ��:-rankings are 
based on the algebraic domain {IN*, min, +}. We could, 
for example, take t, -. _ = tape •pe = t,_ •- = 0. If we pe• pe , pe• pe 
believe that the transition from Spe to Spe is less likely than 
the transition from Spe to sr;e and from sr;e to Spe. we can 
take t•re·•pe = 3, t•re·"re = 1, and t,�,•pe = 1. 
Suppose we get the evidence Estolen• that the car is parked 
at time 0 but gone at time 3. It is easy to verify that 
there are exactly three 3-prefixes with plausibility 0 after 
we condition on Estolen: [spe, sp-e, sr;e, sp-e], [spe, Spe• spe-, spe] 
and [spe, spe-, Bpe, spe]· Thus, the agent believes that the car 
was stolen before time 3, but has no more specific beliefs 
as to when. 
Suppose we instead get the evidence E�orrowed• i.e., that 
the car is parked and has a full tank at time 0, and is still 
parked at time 2. In this case, the most plausible time-
2 prefix is [ spe-, spe, spe-]; the expected observation that the 
car is parked does not cause the agent to believe that any 
change occurred. What happens when he observes that 
the tank is empty, i.e., E6orrowed? There are two possible 
explanations: Either the gas leaked at some stage (so that 
there was a transition from Spe to Spe before time 3) or the 
car was "borrowed" without the agent's knowledge (so that 
there was a transition from Bpe to sp-e and then from sr;e 
to Bpe). Applying the definition of @ we conclude that 
Pl([spe , sp-e, spe]) = 2 and PI([spe, spe-, Spe]) = 3. Thus, the 
agent considers the most likely explanation to be that the 
car was borrowed. 
It is worth noticing how the agent's beliefs after observing 
E�orrowed depend on details of the transition plausibilities 
and the @ function. For the ��:-ranking above, we have 
t.pe-.•pe > t•re-··� C8H.p-e.•pe; with this choice, the most 
likely explanation is [spe, spe-, spe]· If, instead, we had used 
a ��:-ranking such thatt, - •pe < t, _ •- r9Y s- •pe (for exam-pe ' pe ' pe \C)" pe ' 
pJe, by taking ts - Spe = t, - s-= t,_ spe = 1), then the pe• pe• pe pe' 
m�st likely explanation would have been Pl([spe. Spe. spe]). 
Finally, if we had used a ��:-ranking such that t,pe-,•pe = 
t, - •- ®ts- •pe (for example, by taking t, _ •pe = 2 and pe• pe pe• pe' 
t, - s- = t,_ •pe = 1), then the agent would have consid-pe• pe pe• 
ered both explanations possible. I 
As this example shows, using qualitative Markovian plausi­
bilities, the agent can revise earlier beliefs as revision does 
(for example, the agent may revise his beliefs regarding 
whether the car was parked at time 1 once he sees that the 
fuel tank is no longer full), or he may think that a change 
occurred in the world that explains his current beliefs (the 
gas tank leaked). Of course, the agent might also consider 
both explanations to be likely. 
It is interesting to compare the behavior of Markovian plau­
sibility measures in this example to that of Katsuno and 
Mendelzon's update [1991]. As Kautz [1986] noted, given 
Estolen, we should believe that the car was stolen during 
the period we were gone, but should not have more spe­
cific beliefs. Markovian measures give us precisely this 
conclusion. Update, on the other hand, leads us to believe 
that the car was stolen just before we notice that it is gone 
[Friedman and Halpern 1994b]. To see this, note that any 
observation that is implied by the agent's current beliefs 
does not change those beliefs (this is one of Katsuno and 
Mendelzon's postulates). Combined with the fact that up­
date never revises beliefs about the past, we must conclude 
that the agent believes that the car was not stolen at time 1 
or 2. In the second variant, the differences are even more 
significant. Using update, we conclude that there was a 
gas leak. Update cannot reach the conclusion that the car 
was borrowed, since that involves changing beliefs about 
the past: For the agent to consider it possible at time 3 that 
the car was borrowed, he has to change his belief that the 
car was parked at time 2. Moreover, update does not allow 
us to compare the relative plausibility of a gas leak to that 
of the car being borrowed. (See [Friedman and Halpern 
1994b] for further discussion of update's behavior in this 
example.) 
This discussion shows that Markovian priors are useful for 
representing plausibility measures compactly. Moreover, 
they give the user the right level of control: by setting 
the transition plausibilities, the user can encode his pref­
erence regarding various explanations. Markovian priors 
have computational advantages as well, as we now show. 
Given ® and the transition plausibilities, the Markov as­
sumption allows us to compute the plausibilities of every 
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n-prefix;  then using E£1, we can compute whether an event 
A is in Bel�1(E) . When n is large, this procedure is un­
reasonable. We do not want to examine all n-prefixes in 
order to evaluate our beliefs about time n. Fortunately, the 
Markov assumption allows us to maintain our beliefs about 
the current state of the system in an efficient way. 
Suppose that the agent makes a sequence of observations 
01 , 02, . . .. Each observation is a proposition (i .e., a set 
of states). The evidence at time n is simply the accumu-
lated evidence: E., = op l n . . . n O�"l . We are inter­
ested in testing whether A(n) E Bel�1 ( En ) ·  According to 
C l ,  this is equivalent to testing whether PI(A(n) , En) > 
Pl(A(n) , En) ·  
I t  is easy to  see that the plausibilities Pl(Sn = s ,  En) ,  
s E S, suffice for determining whether the agent believes 
A. This follows from the observation that 
Pl(A(n) ,  En) =  EBs EAPJ(Sn = S, En ), 
and similarly for Pl(;[n l , E.,) . 
In addition, it is straightforward for an agent who has the 
plausibilities PI(Sn = s ,  En),  s E S, to update them when 
he makes a new observation. To see this, observe that 
Pl(Sn+I  = s ,  En+ I )  = Pl(Sn+ I = s ,  En , O��i1 l ) .  
Thus, PI(Sn+ I  = s , En+ I )  = l_ if s f/_  On+ I ; otherwise, it 
is Pl(Sn+ I  = s ,  En ) .  In algebraic domains, we can com­
pute the latter plausibility using much the same techniques 
as in probabilistic domains: 
Pl(Sn+ I  = s n En ) 
EBs'EsPl(Sn+I == s iSn = s' ,  En) @ Pl(Sn = 81 , E.,) 
Using the Markov assumption, PI(Sn+l = s iSn = 
s' , En ) = PI(Sn+ !  == s i Sn = s') = t, ' , • ·  Thus, we 
can compute PI(Sn+ I  = s, En+ I )  using Pl(Sn = s1 , En ) 
and the transition plausibilities t, , , s . 
To summarize, there is a simple two-stage procedure for up­
dating beliefs given new observations. In the first stage, we 
compute the plausibility of the current states using our be­
liefs about the previous state. In the second stage, we prune 
states that are inconsistent with the current observation. 
Again, it is interesting to compare this approach to Katsuno 
and Mendelzon's belief update. One of the assumptions 
made by update is that the agent maintains only his beliefs 
about the current state of the system. Roughly speaking, this 
amounts to tracking only the states of the system that have 
maximal plausibility given past observations. Thus, update 
can require less information to update beliefs. This, how­
ever, comes at the price of assuming that abnormalities are 
delayed as much as possible. This, as we saw in the case of 
the borrowed car example, may lead to unintuitive conclu­
sions. We conjecture that to avoid such conclusions, agent 
must keep track of either information about past events or 
degrees of plausibilities of all possible states of the system 
at the current time. 
4.1 Characterizing Markovian Belief Change 
Our formalization of belief change is quite different from 
most in the literature. Most approaches to belief change 
start with a collection of postulates, argue that they are rea­
sonable, and prove some consequences of these postulates. 
Occasionally, a semantic model for the postulates is pro­
vided and a representation theorem is proved (of the form 
that every semantic model corresponds to some belief revi­
sion process, and that every belief revision process can be 
captured by some semantic model). 
We have not discussed postulates at all here. There is a 
good reason for this: Markovian belief change does not 
satisfy any postulates of the standard sort beyond those of 
any other notion of belief change. To make this precise, as­
sume that we have some language L. that includes the usual 
propositional constructs (i.e., V ,  /\ , -, and => ). A plausi­
bility structure (over £) is a tuple PL = (W, :F, D, Pl , 11') , 
where (W, :F ,  D, PI) is a conditional plausibility space, and 
71' is a truth assignment that associates with each world in 
W a complete consistent set of formulas in £.  Given a 
plausibility structure, we can associate with each formula 
r.p in £ the set of states where r.p is true: [r.p]PL = { s E 
S :  ?l'(s) (r.p) =true} . Observing the sequence r.pJ , . . . , r.pn 
at times 1 ,  . . . , n amounts to conditioning on the event 
EPL,<p , ,  . . .  , <f' n  = [r.pi]�� n . . . n [r.pn]�:l. Similarly, r.p is 
believed at time n, given E, if [r.p]PL E Be�1(E) . 
We now define two classes of structures. Let pQPL consist 
of all qualitative plausibility structures, and let pQPL,M 
consist of all qualitative plausibility structures with a 
Markovian plausibility measure. Since pQPL,M c pQPL , 
any formula valid in pQP L (that is, true in every�lausibil­
ity structure in pQPL ) must also be valid in pQ L ,M . As 
we now show, the converse holds as well. 
Theorem 4.4: Let PL == ( W, :F, D, PI, 71') be a plausibility 
structure in pQPL and let n > 0. Then there is a plausibil­
ity structure PL' = (W' , :F' , D' , PI' , 11'1) in pQPL,M such 
that for all sequences of formulas r.p1 , . . .  , 'Pm· m :::; n and 
all formulas tf;, [tP]PL E Bel';; (EPL,<p , ,  . 'I'm)  if and only if 
[tP]PL' E Bet;�, (EPU ,<p , ,  .. , 'I' m ) . 
Proof: (Sketch) Define S' { {s1 , . . . , sm ) 
S J , . . . , Sm E S, m � n} and 71'1( (s J , . . . , sm ) )  
?l'(sm) . We can then construct a Markovian plausi­
bility measure over W' that simulates PI up to time 
n, in that PI' ( [{so) , (so, si ) ,  . . . , (so, s i , . . .  , sm)] ) 
Pl( [so, S J , . . . , sm]) for all m :::; n. I 
It follows from Theorem 4.4 that for any Markovian plau­
sibility structure PL1 ,  there is a non-Markovian plausibility 
structure PL2 such that, for every sequence \OJ , . . . , 'Pn of 
observations in £, the agent has the same beliefs (in the 
language £) after observing r.p1 , . . •  , 'Pn · no matter whether 
his plausibility is characterized by PL1 or PL2 • Thus, there 
are no special postulates for Markovian belief change over 
and above the postulates that hold for any approach to belief 
change. 
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5 PARTIALLY SPECIFIED 
TRANSITIONS 
Up to now, we have implicitly assumed that when the user 
specifies transition plausibilities, he has some underlying 
algebraic domain in mind. This assumption is quite strong, 
since it assumes that the user knows the exact plausibility 
value of the transitions, and the functions @ and E£1 that 
relate them. 
In this section, we focus on situations where the user only 
specifies a partial order on transitions. This is a natural form 
of knowledge that can be specified/assessed in a relatively 
straightforward manner. Given a set S of states, consider 
transition variables of the form x,
,
, , ,  for s, s' E S. We 
think of x ,  , • '  as a variable representing the plausibility 
of the transition from s to s' .  Assume that we are given 
constraints on these transition variables, specified by a par­
tial order :=;1 on the variables, together with constraints of 
the form x•
,
• '  :=;1 .l .6 These can be thought of as con­
straints on the relative plausibility of transitions, together 
with constraints saying that some transitions are impossi­
ble. X s , s '  = .l. We are interested in plausibility measures 
that are consistent with sets of such constraints. 
We say that a set C of constraints is safe if there is no vari­
able y and state s such that the x, ,, , <1 y is in C for all 
s' E S. There is no qualitative plausibility measure that sat­
isfies an unsafe set of constraints. To see this, note that, for 
a given s, t,,,, represent the plausibilities of disjoint events 
for different choices of s' . If we are dealing with qualita­
tive plausibility, if t , , , ,  < t for all s' , then ffis 'ESts ,s ' < t .  
However, w e  also have ffis ' Es ts , s '  = T, and we cannot 
have t > T. Thus, no qualitative plausibility measure can 
satisfy an unsafe set of constraints. However, any safe set 
set of constraints i s  satisfiable. 
Theorem 5.1: Given a safe set C of constraints on the 
transitions over S as above, there is a qualitative Markovian 
plausibility space ( W, F, D, PI) consistent with C. 
Note that this theorem guarantees the existence of a quali­
tative prior. Unlike the situation described in the previous 
section, where transition plausibilities were fully specified, 
there is not in general a unique (qualitative) plausibility 
measure PI consistent with :=; 1 .  This is due to the fact that 
we can choose various plausibility values as well as various 
operators @ and E£1 in the algebraic domain, while remain­
ing consistent with :=;1. To see this, consider the following 
variant of Example 4.3 .  
Example 5.2: Using the notation of Example 4.3, con­
sider the constraints x, - s pe  <1 x , - s- =t x,_ spe < t  pe• pe• pe pe•  
x're·
'
re 
=t x,pe•'pe =t Xspe , s pe · One way o f  satisfy­
ing these constraints is by using the standard x:-ranking 
described in Example 4.3, for which we have t,re,•pe = 
3, t, _ •- = t,_ s pe = 1, and t, 3 = 0 for all states s. If PI pe •  pe pe• ' 
60f course, we take x =t y to be an abbreviation for x :::; , y 
and y :::; 1 x ,  and x < t y to be an abbreviation for x ::; ty and 
not(y ::; , x).  
is the plausibility function generated by this x:-ranking, we 
have Pl( [spe • Sp<; , spe]) = 3 and Pl( [sp<;, spe, spe]) = 2, since 
@ is + for x:-rankings. 
However, now consider another way of satisfying the same 
constraints, again using x:-rankings. Let PI' be a Markovian 
plausibility measure with the following transition plausibil­
ities: t� _ , = 3, t� _ •- = t�- , = 2, and t� , = 0 for pe• pe pe• pe pe• pe , 
all states s. It is easy to verify that PI' satisfies the constraints 
we described above. However, it is easy to check that we 
have PI' ( [ Spe, spe, spe]) = 4 and PI' ( [ Spe, Spe , spe]) = 3. 
This means that Pl( [spe, Spe, spe]) > Pl' ( [spe-, spe , spe]) ,  
while PI'([spe, spe, spe] ) < Pl( [spe • sr;e, spe] ) .  Thus, al­
though PI and PI' satisfy the same constraints on transi­
tion plausibilities, they lead to different orderings of the 
3-prefixes, and thus to different notions of belief change. I 
Constraints on the relative order of transition plausibilities 
do give rise to some constraints on the relative plausibility 
of n-prefixes. It is these constraints that we now study. 
We start with some notation. Let C be a safe set of con­
straints on transition variables, and let PI be a Markovian 
measure consistent with these constraints. As we observed, 
Pl([so, . . .  , sn ] )  = t,0 , , 1 @ · · · @ t, , _ ,  , s , once we fix the 
transition plausibilities and @. Thus, the plausibility of a 
sequence is determined by the transitions involved. The 
constraints in C determine an ordering :::S on n-prefixes as 
follows: 
[so , s 1 , . . .  , sn] :::S [so ,  s� , . . .  , s�] if there is some 
constraint of the form x, ,  • ' = .l in C (where 
a ,  •+I  
we take s� = s0), or if there is some permu­
tation (}' over { 0, I ,  . . . , n} such that (J'(O) = 0 
and x•
,
• •
+
' :s;t x,�(
i )
,
u(i+ l ) is in C, for i = 
O, . . . , n - 1 ?  
We define -< and R: using :::S i n  the standard manner. If 
[so, s1 , . . . , sn] R: [so, s� , . . .  , s�] we say these two n­
prefixes are equivalent. Intuitively, :::S captures what is 
forced by all Markov plausibility measures consistent with 
:=;1 ,  since it captures what is true for all choices of @ in 
normal conditional plausibility spaces. 
Theorem 5.3: Let PI be a Markovian plausibility measure 
consistent with some constraints C, and let :::S be defined as 
above in terms of C. If [so , S J , . . .  , sn] :::S [so, s; , . . . 1 s�] , 
then Pl( [so ,  s 1 , . . .  , sn]) :::; Pl( [so, s� ,  . . .  , s�] ) . More­
over, if [so , s 1 ,  . . •  1 sn] -< [so , s� , . . .  , s�], then 
Pl( [so, s1 , . . . , sn] )  < Pl([so 1 s; ,  . . .  , s�] ) . 
The converse to Theorem 5.3 does not hold in general. 
A Markovian plausibility measure consistent with C may 
introduce more comparisons between n-prefixes than those 
determined by the :::S ordering. 
Example 5.4: Consider again the setup of Example 4.3, us­
ing the constraints on transitions considered in Example 5.2. 
Applying the definition of � .  we find that [spe• Sp<; , spe] -< 
7Note that we take so = s!. and a-( 0) = 0 because we are only 
interested in n-prefixes with initial state so. 
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[sp;;, Spe, sp;;] and similarly (spe;, sjie, Spe] --< [sp;; , Spe. spe] · 
It is easy to verify that the plausibility measure PI de­
scribed in Example 5 .2 satisfies these constraints. How­
ever, [sp;; , sp;;, Spe] is incomparable to (spe, spe, spe] accord­
ing to �. but, as we calculated in Example 5 .2 ,  we have 
Pl( (sp;; , Spe1 spe]) < Pl( (sp;; , sp;; , spe] ) . I 
Although, in general, a Markovian plausibility measure will 
place more constraints than those implied by �. we can use 
the construction of Theorem 5.1 to show that there is in fact 
a plausibility measure that precisely captures � -
Theorem 5.5: Given a safe set of constraints C, there is a 
qualitative Markovian plausibility measure PI. consistent 
with C such that [so ,  S J , . . .  , sn ] ::5 (so, s; , . . .  , s�] if and 
only if Pl. ( [so, S J ,  • • .  , sn ] )  :<::; PI. ( [so , s; ,  . . . , s�] ) . 
These results show that examining the relative plausibility 
of transitions allows to deduce the relative plausibilities of 
some n-prefixes. We can use this knowledge to conclude 
what beliefs must hold in any Markovian measure with these 
transition plausibilities. We need an additional definition: 
MAY' (E) =def U{ [so , S J , . . .  , sn] � E I 
If[ so, s; , . . .  , s� ]  � E, [so ,  S t ,  . . .  , sn] -/< [so , s; , . . .  , s�] } .  
MAY' (E) i s  the event defined as the union of n-prefixes 
in E that are maximal according to --< .  It easily follows 
from axiom A2 that in any qualitative Markovian measure 
consistent with S:1 , the plausibility of MAX" (E) given E 
is greater than the plausibility of MAX'(E) given E. As a 
consequence, we have the following result. 
Theorem 5.6: Suppose PI is a qualitative Markovian mea­
sure consistent with some set C of constraints, E is a 
time-n event, and A � S. If MAX' (E) � A(n ), then 
A E Beln (E). 
Thus, by examining the most plausible (according to �) 
n-prefixes, we get a sufficient condition for a set A to be 
believed. The converse to Theorem 5 .6 does not hold: the 
agent might believe A even if some of the n-prefixes are not 
in A (n ) .  However, the n-prefixes in MAXn (E) are equally 
plausible, then the converse does hold. 
Proposition 5.7: Suppose PI is a qualitative Markovian 
measure consistent with some set C of constraints, E is a 
time-n event, and A <;;; S. If all the n-prefixes in (i.e., the 
ones that are subsets of) MAY' (E) are equivalent, then 
MAX' (E) <; A(n) if and only if A E Bef' (E). 
Example 5.8: We now examine the setup of Example 4.3 
using partially specified transition plausibilities. To cap­
ture our intuition that changes are unlikely, we require that 
x, ,s :'St x , ,  , s 't for all s, s' , s" E { Spe, Spe ,  spe-} . We also as­
sume that x, - s pe ,  x s - s- , and x s� spe are all strictly less 
pe •  pe • pe pe •  
likely than x ,  _ • - ,  but are not comparable to each other. pe• pe 
Finally, we assume all other transitions are impossible. 
Suppose we get the evidence E,10ten .  that the car is 
parked at time 0 but gone at time 3. It is easy to 
verify that MAX3 ( Estolen) consists of the three 3-prefixes 
[sp;;, sp;; , Sjie , sp;;] .  [spe, Spe, spe, spe] , and [sp;; , spe; , Spe . spe-] . 
Moreover, it easy to check that these three 3-prefixes are 
equivalent. From Proposition 5.7, it  now follows that if 
PI is a qualitative Markovian measure, then MAX3 ( Estolen) 
characterizes the agent's beliefs. The agent believes that 
the car was stolen before time 3, but has no more specific 
beliefs as to when. This proves that all Markovian priors 
that are consistent with S:t generate the same beliefs as the 
��:-ranking described in Example 5 .2, given this observation. 
Suppose we instead get the evidence Eiorrowed' that the car is 
parked and has a full tank at time 0, and is still parked at time 
2. In this case, we have MAX2( E�orrowed) = [ spe;, Spe ,  sp;;)­
the expected observation that the car is parked does not 
cause the agent to believe that any change occurred. 
What happens when he observes that the tank is empty, 
i .e. ,  E�orrowed? As noted in Example 4.3, there are two pos­
sible explanations: Either the gas leaked or the car was "bor­
rowed". Without providing more information, we should 
not expect the agent to consider one of these cases to be 
more plausible than the others. Indeed, it is easy to verify 
that MAX3 ( E�orrowed) contains all the 3-prefixes that corre­
spond to these two explanations. Unlike the previous case, 
some of these 3-prefixes are not equivalent. Thus, differ­
ent qualitative Markovian plausibility measures may lead 
to different beliefs at time 3, even if they are consistent with 
the specifications. 
If we add the further constraint x ,  _ ,_ <t x, _ 'pe (so that pe• pe pe •  
a gas leak i s  more plausible than a theft), then the most likely 
3-prefixes are the ones where there i s  a gas leak. However, 
if we specify that x, _ •pe is less likely than both x, _ •- and pe • pe• pe 
x•-pe· 'pe (so that a gas leak is less plausible than the car being 
taken or returned), then MAX3(E�orrowed) will still contain 
both explanations. Even with this additional i nformation, 
� cannot compare [sp;; , Sjie ,  spe , Spe] to [sp;;, spe, Spe, spe) . be­
cause although t, _ •pe < t, _ •- and t, _ • pe < t,_ •pe • it pe •  pe · pe pe • pe • 
might be that t, _ •pe '><:- t, _ • _ J t, _ s- '><:- t,_ •pe . Our pe• I0J pe• pe ..,... pe• pe I0J pe '  
specification, in general, does not guarantee that one expla­
nation is preferred to the other. I 
We note that we can use the procedure described above to 
maintain an estimate of the agents beliefs at each time point. 
This involves using the Markovian- plausibil ity space Pl. of 
Theorem 5 .5 .  We discuss the details in  the full paper. 
6 RELATED WORK 
We now briefly compare our approach to others in  the liter­
ature. 
Markovian belief change provides an approach for dealing 
with sequences of observations. Iterated belief revision, 
which also deals with sequences of observations, has been 
the focus of much recent attention (see [Lehmann 1995] 
and the references therein). Conditioning a prior plausi­
bility measure provides a general approach to dealing with 
i terated belief revision. By using conditioning, we are im­
plicitly assuming that the observations made provide correct 
information about the world. We cannot condition on an 
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inconsistent sequence of observations. This assumption al­
lows us to avoid some of the most problematic aspects of 
belief revision, and focus our attention instead on putting 
additionaJ structure into the prior, so as to be able to express 
in a straightforward way natural notions of belief change. 
One of the goals of Markovian belief change is to be able 
to combine aspects of revision and update. Recent work 
of B outilier [ 1 995] is similarly motivated. Essentially, 
Boutilier proposes conditioningon sequences of length two, 
using ��:-rankings. While he does not pursue the probabil is­
tic analogy, his discussion describes the belief change op­
eration as a combination of beliefs about the state of the 
system, i.e., Pl(S1 = s) and beliefs about the l ikelihood 
of transitions, i.e., PI( Sz = s' IS1 = s ). Boutilier pro­
poses a two-stage procedure for updating belief which is 
similar to the one we outlined in Section 4. It is impor­
tant to note that we derived this procedure using standard 
probabilistic arguments, something that Boutilier was not 
able to do in his framework. Our work, which was done 
independently of Boutilier's, can be viewed as extending 
his framework. We have arbitrary sequences of states, not 
just one-step transitions. In addition, because our approach 
is based on plausibility, not K-rankings, we can deal with 
partially-ordered plausibilities. 
Finally, we note that the Markov assumption has been used 
extensively in the l iterature on probabilistic reasoning about 
action. Papers on this topic typically represent situations 
using dynamic belie/networks [Dean and Kanazawa 1989). 
Dynamic belief n etworks are essentially Markov chains 
with additional structure on states: A state is assumed to be 
characterized by the vaJues of a number of variables. The 
probability of a transition is described by a belief network. 
Belief networks allow us to express more independence as­
sumptions than just those characterizing Markovian prob­
abilities. For example, using a belief network, we can 
state that the value of variable x2 at time n + 1 is inde­
pendent of the value of X 1 at time n given the value of 
X2 at time n. Darwiche [ 1992] showed how qualitative 
Bayesian networks could be captured in his framework; it 
should be straightforward to add such structure to the plau­
sibility framework as well ,  once we restrict to structured 
plausibility spaces. 
7 DISCUSSION 
This paper makes two important contributions. First, we 
demonstrate how the Markov assumption can be imple­
mented in a qualitative setting that allows for a natural 
notion of belief. While similar intuitions regarding inde­
pendence may have guided previous work on belief change 
(e.g., [Katsuno and Mendelzon 199 1 ]), we are the first to 
make an explicit Markovian assumption. We believe that 
this approach provides a naturaJ means of constructing a 
plausibility assessment over sequences g iven an assessment 
of the plausibility of transitions. Moreover, as we have seen, 
this assumption also leads to computational benefits similar 
to these found in the probabilistic setting. 
Second, we examined what conclusions can be drawn given 
only an ordering on the transition plausibilities. Starting 
with a specification of constraints on the relative plausibility 
of transitions, we describe properties of the belief change 
operation. Since all we consider are comparisons between 
plausibilities of transitions, our conclusions are not always 
that strong. Of course, it is reasonable to consider richer 
forms of constraints, that might also constrain the behavior 
of ® and ffi. With more constraints, we can typically prove 
more about how the agent's beliefs will change. In future 
work, we plan to examine the consequences of using richer 
constraints. 
One of the standard themes of the belief change literature is 
the effort to characterize a class of belief-change operators 
by postulates, such as the AGM postulates for belief revi­
sion [Alchourr6n, Gardenfors, and Makinson 1985] and the 
Katsuno-Mendelzon postulates for belief update [Katsuno 
and Mendelzon 1991) . As the discussion in Section 4. 1  
shows, characterizing Markovian belief change with such 
postulates does not provide additional insight. The trouble 
is that such postulates do not let us reason about relative 
likelihoods of transitions and independence of transitions. 
But this is precisely the kind of reasoning that motivates the 
use of Markovian plausibility (and probability) measures. 
Such reasoning clearly plays a key role in modeling the 
stolen car problem and its variants. If the language is too 
weak to allow us to express such reasoning (as is the case 
for the language used to express the AGM postulates), then 
we cannot distinguish the class of Markovian plausibility 
measures from the class of all plausibility measures. 
This suggests that the right language to reason about belief 
change should aJlow us to taJk about transitions and their 
relative plausibility. As our examples show, applications 
are often best described in these terms. This observation 
has implications for reasoning about action as well as be­
lief change. Typical action-representation methodologies, 
such as the situation calculus [McCarthy and Hayes 1969], 
describe the changes each action brings about when ap­
plied in various states. Such a description talks about the 
most likely transition, given that the action occurred. Most 
approaches, however, do not explicitly deal with the less 
likely effects of actions. In a certain class of problems 
(called predictive problems in [Lin and Shoham 1991 ]), i t  
suffices to specify only the most likely transitions. Roughly 
speaking, in these problems we are given information about 
the initial state, and we are interested in the beliefs about 
the state of the world after some sequence of actions. In 
such theories, we never get a surprising observation. Thus, 
only the most likely transitions play a role in the reasoning 
process. Problems appear when surprising observations are 
allowed. Kautz's stolen car problem is a canonical exam­
ple of a situation with a surprising observation. As our 
example i l lustrates, in order to get reasonable conclusions 
in such theories, we need to provide information about the 
relative likelihood of all transitions, instead of identifying 
just the most likely transitions. We believe that a language 
for reasoning about actions and/or beliefs that change over 
time should allow the user to compare the plausibility of 
transitions (and sequences of transitions), giving as much 
or as little detail as desired. We believe that our approach 
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provides the right tools to deal with these issues. We hope 
to return to this issue in future work. 
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